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Contested Sovereignty as an Opportunity: Understanding 
Democratic Transitions in Unrecognized States 
Recent studies have demonstrated that democratic transitions can take place 
even in political entities that lack international sovereignty, or recognition. 
Based upon democratic transitions in several unrecognized states, they have 
argued that such process requires mainly the existence of a functioning 
government and basic state-institutions. Non-recognition has been at most as 
an incentive for governments of unrecognized states to appear democratic, in 
the hope of securing international legitimacy and recognition. Building upon 
this literature, this paper argues that non-recognition is not merely a passive 
factor in the democratization. Rather, it may actually play a positive role in 
facilitating transitions. This is because the crisis of legitimacy that results from 
non-recognition often leads to debates and deliberation between the 
unrecognized states and the international community, makes the leaderships of 
unrecognized states more vulnerable to scrutiny and creates opportunity 
structures for transnational advocacy networks. To support this argument, this 
article examines the democratic transition which has taken place in the 
Kurdistan Regional Government since its emergence as an unrecognized state 
in 1991. This transition, it asserts, cannot be understood without relating to the 
KRG’s status as an unrecognized state and its pursuit of international 
legitimacy. 
Key words: democratization; sovereignty; recognition; legitimacy; advocacy; 
transnationalism; liberation; Kurdistan; Iraq 
Can state-building take place where no state exists? Can we discuss reforms in 
political entities that lack any legal status? Is democracy necessarily linked with 
statehood? These questions have been brought up in recent studies of democratic 
transitions in unrecognized states. These works have sought to challenge the tendency 
to associate democratization with statehood. Relying on a diverse pool of case studies, 
they have argued that democratic transitions can take place even without statehood, or 
more precisely – without international recognition.1 
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This paper follows these works in challenging the association between 
democratization and recognition. However, it goes a step further by arguing that not 
only democratic transition can take place in spite of the absence of international 
recognition, but that often democratization may take place because of non-
recognition. The crisis of legitimacy caused by non-recognition can serve as a catalyst 
for democratization among unrecognized states.2 This is because such crisis of 
legitimacy usually leads to the pursuit of international legitimacy, and consequently to 
more interaction between the unrecognized state and the international community. 
This interaction, in turn, is a key to democratic transitions, as it involves exchanges of 
ideas, debates about the nature of statehood and constant communication. 
To support this argument, this paper presents the case of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government in Iraq (KRG). The KRG emerged as an unrecognized state in 
1991, taking control over the Kurdish populated governorates in Northern Iraq. 
During the first two decades of its existence, the Kurdistan Region experienced a 
significant, even if not linear, democratic transition. As this paper demonstrates, this 
process benefited from the KRG’s crisis of legitimacy. Before examining the case of 
the KRG, it is necessary to further discuss the literature on democratization in 
unrecognized states, and posit the argument promoted here within this context.  
 
International Sovereignty and Democratization: Breaking the Knot 
Very few studies have investigated the link between sovereignty and democracy. 
Some observers have objected from outset to the possibility of democratization and 
liberalization in unrecognized states, claiming that separatism is usually associated 
with ethnic cleansing and exclusionary sentiments.3 But most commonly, Oisín 
3 
 
Tansey notes, this has derived from the fact that most students a priori assume that 
sovereignty is a precondition for democratization.4 
Several studies have systematically challenged this predisposition in the 
scholarship. Based on the cases of Kosovo,5 Somaliland,6 Nagorno-Karabakh,7 
Abkhazia, Taiwan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),8 to name a 
few, these works broke the Gordian knot between “statehood” and democratization. 
As they have demonstrated, these de facto independent entities have succeeded in 
democratizing their systems in spite of their failure to secure international recognition. 
An important foundation for these accounts has been Stephen Krasner’s thesis that 
sovereignty is a multifaceted institution, which can be interpreted in different ways. 
International recognition, or international legal sovereignty, is only one use of the 
term. Domestic sovereignty, namely the actor’s effective control over the territory it 
claims to rule, is one more dimensions. Another use of the term sovereignty is as 
Westphalian sovereignty, i.e. an actor’s right to exclude other actors from intervening 
in its authority structures. Finally, interdependence sovereignty refers to the actor’s 
ability to prevent other actors from crossing its territory.9 Unrecognized states are 
actors that have managed to gain domestic and interdependence sovereignty, but are 
deprived of international and Westphalian sovereignty. The existence of domestic 
sovereignty is essential, because it implies the existence of the basic infrastructure 
necessary for reforms, such as government and bureaucracy.10  
Non-recognition, nonetheless, can in fact significantly affect the prospects of 
democratic transitions. This is because non-recognition necessarily translates into a 
crisis of legitimacy, which can lead to changes in the conduct of actors. Previous 
studies of democratic transitions in unrecognized states have mostly identified the 
crisis of legitimacy as a source of democratization. Barry Bartmann notes that crises 
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of legitimacy usually drive actors to orient their foreign policy toward self-
justification.11 Both Bartmann and Caspersen observe that unrecognized states have 
tended to justify their existence based on practical terms, or what Caspersen has 
defined as earned sovereignty, namely the idea that they deserve to exist and 
eventually be recognized based on their long-term success in running their own affairs 
notwithstanding non-recognition.12 
In the post-Cold War era, when most contemporary unrecognized states 
emerged, democracy has become a de facto, and in the case of Kosovo de jure, 
precondition for recognition. As a result it has also become a central element in the 
unrecognized states’ discourse of earned sovereignty. Most influential in this sense 
was the Standards before Status policy applied to Kosovo. This policy, initiated by the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo, presented eight principles which the local 
Kosovar authorities had to meet in order for Kosovo’s status and pleas for 
international recognition be considered. This policy has inspired other unrecognized 
states, such as Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland,15 to embrace these 
same principles, revolving around democratization, protection of minority rights, 
freedom of expression and private property, and claim the right to exist and be 
recognized on the grounds of meeting these principles.16 This model of 
democratization, and especially its promotion by the United States and the European 
Union, has often been criticized as serving only narrow elite groups in the target 
countries,17 or as a form of neo-imperialism.18 However, it has gained centrality 
among unrecognized states in their campaign for legitimation, which makes it valid, at 
least for the purpose of this research. 
The literature on democratization in unrecognized states has pinpointed the 
crisis of legitimacy as an incentive for unrecognized states to appear democratic, and 
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the causes for that. Nevertheless, the crisis of legitimacy has not only provided an 
incentive for democratization. Viewing non-recognition as an incentive may explain 
why unrecognized states aspire to appear democratic, but it cannot explain genuine 
democratic transitions, especially in entities that emerged in regions with only limited 
democratic traditions, such as the former Soviet Union, the Middle East or the Horn 
of Africa. As Caspersen has noted, eager to demonstrate their earned sovereignty, 
leaders of unrecognized states can establish façade democracies in order to “please 
international audiences.”19 But they do not always pay attention to domestic 
discontent. 
The importance of the crisis of legitimacy lies in the fact that it creates the 
necessary conditions for democratic transitions: interaction, communicative action, 
and an opportunity structure for transnational actors to advocate reforms. Non-
recognition and the resultant crisis of legitimacy are important because they start a 
process which may result in a democratic transition. Caspersen has identified the 
beginning of such process, noting in her analysis of democratization in the Eurasian 
unrecognized states that “the perception of an external pressure to create a certain 
kind of entity can help empower civilian leaders against warlords and may dampen 
willingness to challenge incumbents.”20 She concludes, however, by arguing that non-
recognition “does not appear to significantly affect democratization.”21 On the other 
hand, in their study Kolstø and Blakkisrud have gone as far as arguing that “non-
recognition is probably the single most important factor in explaining the promotion 
of democracy in Nagorno-Karabakh.”22 The argument here seeks to bridge these two 
views on the link between the crisis of legitimacy and democratization. At least in 
some cases, non-recognition has positively affected political reforms in unrecognized 
states. On the other hand, non-recognition should not be singled out as the most 
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important factor in democratization, but as one which is only relevant as part of a 
greater mechanism, which includes popular demands for democratization, interaction 
and advocacy. 
 
Non-recognition as a Catalyst for Democratization 
If the crisis of legitimacy is an incentive for unrecognized states to appear democratic, 
then the interaction that results from this crisis carries the potential to compel 
unrecognized states to actually meet their rhetorical commitments. This is because 
interaction involves communicative action, and especially deliberation and the 
exchange of ideas, between the unrecognized state and various other actors about the 
nature of legitimacy and statehood. 
Interaction has facilitated democratic transitions for two main reasons: first, 
because it has relied on domestic (or earned) sovereignty, which also became 
associated with democratization; and second, because it has facilitated transnational 
advocacy of reforms. Governments’ commitment to democratization is not 
tantamount to real transitions. Even if the leaders of unrecognized states truly believe 
that democratization may earn them recognition, they still face constraints in the 
process. This is not merely due to greed or lust for power. Rather, even the desire to 
establish a strong and coherent entity that could face external threats may drive 
leaders of unrecognized states to prefer allying with local warlords and prevent 
internal debates.23 
Nonetheless, even if utilitarian in nature, the commitments to democratization 
made by the governments of unrecognized states make them more vulnerable to 
7 
 
criticism for failing to meet them. Opposition parties, and fledgling civil society 
organizations, jointly with “external” actors, may use this vulnerability to advocate 
domestic reforms and demand their governments to adhere to their own statements.24 
In other cases, transnational networks may facilitate democratization by conveying 
new ideas and norms. Several studies have highlighted the importance of transnational 
advocacy networks to the promotion of reforms and globally-held norms within norm 
violating actors. Networks comprising of international non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations (including UN agencies) and individuals, 
working jointly with local forces, played a strategic role in promoting freedom of 
expression, gendered equality and green policies.25 Such advocacy networks have 
been successful in exploiting opportunity structures, and have developed a strategy 
that has turned them into powerful engines of change: putting norm-violating states on 
the international agenda in terms of moral consciousness-raising; empowering and 
legitimating the claims of domestic opposition groups against norm-violating 
governments, and by so partially protecting the physical integrity of such groups from 
government repression; and challenging norm-violating governments by creating a 
transnational structure pressuring such governments simultaneously “from above” and 
“from below,” hence minimizing options for repression.26 This paper as well does not 
ignore the importance of other factors, and especially the need to secure domestic 
legitimacy, local pressures for reform and even the need of elites to settle disputes 
through elections. It does, however, underline the crisis of legitimacy and its pursuit 
as an instigating factor – one which prompts other processes and is inseparable of 
democratization. 
This is not to argue that democratization and reforms are confined to 
unrecognized states. Democratization and political reforms have, of course, taken 
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place among well-established states, whose sovereignty is not contentious. 
Furthermore, in many cases these reforms were the result, at least partly, of 
transnational advocacy and the efforts made by coalitions of domestic and global 
activists. The comprehensive volume edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and 
Kathryn Sikkink documents political reforms in cases as diverse as Morocco, Chile, 
Kenya and Guatemala, to name but a few.27 Elsewhere Keck and Sikkink shed light 
on the pivotal role cooperation between grassroots human rights activists and 
international NGOs and eventually foreign governments played in the removal of 
human rights violating regimes in Mexico and Argentina.28 
Certainly, not all reforms have been the outcome of transnational advocacy; 
while globally-held ideas have always inspired reforms, they did not always 
necessitate the presence of “external” actors. But in the post-Cold War era, 
transnationalism has become far more visible as an element in reforms. Globalization, 
the influx of population and interaction between populations has made 
transnationalism a dominant element in processes of change. 
What I do argue here is that the power of transnationalism applies as well to 
unrecognized states, a point which has gone generally unnoticed by students of 
unrecognized states. Moreover, I argue that unrecognized states may be somewhat 
more receptive to transnational activism than well-established states. For instance, 
since many of the unrecognized states have emerged out of devastating conflicts, they 
are bound to rely on international aid. Most of this aid is offered by international 
NGOs and UN agencies, although in some cases, aid may also be delivered by the 
unrecognized state’s patron state (the TRNC, Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have relied heavily on aid from Turkey, Armenia and Russia 
respectively). But international aid does not always remain limited to relief-
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operations.29 It often comes to concern democratization and political reforms. 
Intervention also allows these actors to build links with both the authorities and the 
local populations. The existence of influential diaspora communities also contributes 
to openness to transnational activism. Diaspora activists usually take part in the 
process of state-building, and therefore serve as a central element in transnational 
networks.  
That the absence of international sovereignty can prompt some profound 
democratic transitions has been noted in several studies of Taiwan. During the mid-
1990s Taiwan became a de facto state, when its leadership (not unequivocally) 
renounced its claims for controlling the whole of China and stated its desire for the 
formation of an independent Taiwan side by side with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). The first signs of democratization in Taiwan, in the shape of the 1996 
democratic elections, took place in parallel to the Taiwanese government’s campaign 
to legitimize the aspiration to establish a Taiwanese state. Whereas some have 
described this as a propaganda that aimed to satisfy international public opinion,30 
others have actually seen it as an effort by Taiwanese statesmen to build an identity 
distinct from that of the PRC.31 This, in turn, got a genuine democratic transition 
under way. As one close observer of Taiwanese politics has noted, “The process of 
democratization was at once a product and an instigator of a dynamic change to the 
domestic order which could not but alter the basis of Taiwan's claim to international 
recognition.”32 Early signs of democratization drove students and intellectuals to 
protest and advance further reforms in the country.33 By the mid-2000s Taiwan has 
become one of the more vibrant parliamentary democracies in the East Asia.34 In the 
case of Somaliland as well, several studies have underlined the role played by 
members of the diaspora community in advancing democratization. While clan elders 
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at first resisted the attempts to undermine their authority in favour of an elected 
government, members of diaspora used their impact to compel the elders to relinquish 
some of their authority to the government.35 Later, members of the diaspora began to 
take an active part in the democratic transition, either as advocates of democratization 
and gender equality,36 or as candidates for political positions. Somaliland’s 
commitments for democratization as a foundation for its recognition served these 
efforts as well.37 
To summarize the argument so far, the crisis of legitimacy which is embodied 
in non-recognition can be seen as a primary factor, which has the potential to instigate 
two important secondary factors: an incentive to democratize, and interaction which, 
through communicative action, might lead to democratization. Nonetheless, this does 
not imply that non-recognition necessary leads to democratization. Two notable 
examples for unrecognized states that have failed to go through a sustainable 
democratic transition are Tamil Eelam and South Ossetia. Their case, though, does 
not invalidate the argument that the pursuit of legitimacy may drive democratic 
transition. This is because these two entities never really engaged in such a pursuit. 
Tamil Eelam remained isolated from the international community under an inherently 
anti-democratic movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.41 And while the 
South Ossetian leadership did seek initially to justify its existence based on its 
democratic credibility, later it came to seek unification with the Russian Federacy 
than to secure independence.42 Thus, in these cases legitimacy was actually absent 
from the equation. 
Still, the deficiency of international sovereignty may indeed have negative 
implications over the political development of unrecognized states. According to 
Caspersen, one reason is that the crisis of legitimacy may give rise to a siege 
11 
 
mentality. Under such circumstances, the leadership may find it easier to constrain 
elements of democracy such as freedom of speech and freedom of movement, while 
the opposition might enact self-restraint for the purpose of unity. She also suggests 
lack of resources as another hindrance to democratization, though she notes that this 
applies to recognized states as well. Finally, Caspersen maintains that the long 
existence in a legal limbo may eventually cause unrecognized states to “run out of 
steam and find themselves in seemingly perpetual transition.” Thus, she concludes, 
non-recognition is a “double-edge sword,” providing both “impetus” and constraints 
for democratization.43  
And yet, despite this deficiency, most unrecognized states have actually 
experienced a long, even if far from complete, transition. Somaliland, Abkhazia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the TRNC, Taiwan, Kosovo and the KRG have all been 
documented to have gone democratic transitions, although at different levels. The 
Democratic transition in the Kurdistan Region provides us with a vivid illustration of 
this process.  
 
The KRG: Unrecognized Statehood and the ‘Democratic Experiment’ 
The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is in fact part of “Greater Kurdistan,” as referred to by 
Kurdish nationalists. In spite of the implicit promises made by the Western powers to 
establish a Kurdish state at the end of the First World War, the area claimed by 
Kurdish nationalists was eventually divided between the newly founded states of Iraq, 
Turkey, Iran and Syria. During the interwar period Kurdish nationalists still struggled 
for the reunification and independence of Greater Kurdistan. Nonetheless, this 
struggle gradually became state-based, with local-patriot Kurdish movements now 
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struggling for self-determination within their states.44 In Iraq, the Kurdish liberation 
campaign began in 1961, and until 1991 it took the shape of insurgency and guerrilla 
operations against government targets and the Iraqi army.45 
The formation of the KRG in 1991 ended the stage of insurgency. Following 
its defeat in the Gulf War and under the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
688, the Iraqi military withdrew from the governorates of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and 
Dohuk. It was soon followed by the Iraqi bureaucracy, which left an administrative 
vacuum in the region. This vacuum was filled almost immediately by the Kurdistan 
Front, the umbrella organization of the various Kurdish guerrilla movements, 
dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). In order to consolidate its sovereignty over the region, the Front 
agreed on holding regional elections, leading to the formation of a regional parliament 
and government. 
Notwithstanding popular pressure to do so, the Kurdish leadership refrained 
from declaring independence. Aware of general international antagonism toward this 
move, the Kurdish leadership declared unanimously that it had no separatist 
aspirations, at least in the short term. Yet, by 1994 the KRG achieved an 
unprecedented level of autonomy. With its own administration, security forces and 
symbols of sovereignty e.g. flag, anthem and even currency, the KRG consolidated 
domestic sovereignty. And under the protection of the allied forces in the region, in 
the form of a no-fly zone, it also secured interdependence sovereignty. The KRG’s 
hesitance to declare independence has led students of unrecognized statehood to 
exclude it from this category and refrain using it as a case study.47 Nevertheless, this 
line of reasoning ignores the complex nature of sovereignty, and the fact that 
obtaining domestic sovereignty does not necessarily require legal sovereignty. 
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Throughout its existence the KRG has secured a wide autonomy from Baghdad in 
almost every field. Moreover, the Kurdish leadership has in fact implied on different 
occasions that the possibility of secession is always on the table.48 
The KRG’s de facto secession from Iraq was denounced from the outset by its 
neighbours, with Ankara as the leading veto-power. This was mainly due to its fears 
of a spill-over effect on the Turkish Kurdish population, concentrated on the other 
side of Iraq’s border. This crisis of legitimacy had negative implications over the 
KRG’s survival prospects. International support for the KRG’s cause was necessary in 
order at least to convince the allies to keep the no-fly zone. 
Consequently, the KRG viewed democratization as a key to proving its earned 
sovereignty. The political developments of the post-Cold War era and the recognition 
of the new states in the Balkans and Eurasia clearly shaped the KRG’s strategy. As 
one of the founding members of the regional parliament noted 
The democratic principle has been shown to have universal validity… the IKF 
[Iraqi Kurdistan Front], as a de facto ruling power… intends to reconstruct 
Kurdish society on the basis of democracy and respect for human rights in 
accordance with international norms and agreements. It will demonstrate to the 
world that the people of Iraqi Kurdistan are capable of such self-government.49 
Subsequently, in May 1992 the Kurdish parties held elections. The elections 
were monitored by international organization, which described them as the “full and 
free expression of the wishes of the Iraqi Kurdish electorate.”50 The KDP and the 
PUK were the only ones to cross the 7 percent threshold set in the 1991 regional 
Election Law. The KDP won a slight victory, but the two parties agreed on a coalition 
government. The parliament’s 100 seats were divided on an equal basis, and so were 
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the ministries. Each minister was appointed with a deputy from the other party. Five 
additional seats were allocated to representatives of the Christian minorities. 
The relatively successful elections became a recurring motive in the KRG’s 
legitimation campaign. KRG representatives and sympathisers began to refer to it as 
the “democratic experiment” in Iraq. In an interview following the elections, Jalal 
Talabani, the PUK’s leader, declared that “I personally believe that the elections 
proved that the Kurdish people… can exercise government in their region and that 
they deserve to enjoy the right to self-determination within a unified democratic 
Iraq.”51 Mas’ud Barzani, the KDP’s leader, declared already prior to the elections that 
“These elections should demonstrate to the entire world that when our people are 
given the chance, we can run our own affairs.”52 
In spite of the statements, the 1992 elections in the Kurdistan Region cannot 
be seen as a democratic transition in itself. Not only that the process of elections is 
only one aspect of democracy, but the new system was essentially undemocratic. The 
Kurdish militias, the Peshmerga, remained all powerful in the region. The 7 percent 
threshold left most parties out of the political system. Women remained largely 
excluded from the process and domestic violence was ignored by the authorities. And 
the division of labour between the PUK and the KDP led to political stagnation, 
which eventually deteriorated in 1994 into a full scale civil war. This internecine war, 
which lasted until 1997, tore the region apart and practically impeded the state-
building process. By its end, the KRG was divided into two administrations, each 
controlled by a different party.54 
Thus, the KRG claims were clearly utilitarian, aiming to secure domestic and 
international legitimacy. However, they paved the way to further transitions. This is 
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because the protracted crisis of legitimacy created opportunities for a wide range of 
external actors to take part in the process of state-building. International NGOs and 
aid-agencies participated in the process from its beginning, aiding the impoverished 
KRG. These included international NGOs, such as German Caritas, the Australian 
CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, and Christian Aid; UN agencies such as the UN 
High Commission for Refugees; and governmental aid agencies, such as the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the British Overseas 
Development Administration. They orchestrated projects such as the resettlement of 
refugees and internally displaced people, recovering of destroyed infrastructure. They 
also opened schools, trained teachers and paid their salaries. Some forms of 
international aid survived even during the civil war. This was the case of the Oil for 
Food Program (OFFP), initiated by the UNSC as a way of providing the Iraqi 
population with its basic needs without violating the 1991 economic sanctions on 
Iraq. This aid was the KRG’s only connection with the outside world. It therefore 
established a tradition of interaction between the KRG and international aid 
organizations. Whereas other states in the region have often treated NGOs with some 
suspicion, blaming them for serving as agents of foreign governments, the KRG could 
not make such claims due to its early encounters with aid organization. And as Denise 
Natali demonstrates, primary aid-relief operations paved the way for the introduction 
of new norms.55 For example, the OFFP allowed the return of UN agencies to the 
Kurdistan Region, such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). These agencies used the newly available resources to engage with the 
KRG. According to Natali, 
They taught principles of good governance, negotiation, and administration by 
conducting regular meetings with KRG representatives and incorporating local 
personnel into legitimate bodies. KRG representatives and local populations 
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were liaised with the UN and gained professional experience and language skills, 
while learning about the policies and protocols of international organizations.56 
Consequently, the OFFP constituted another step toward the change in the nature of 
aid to the Kurdistan Region, and to the prospects of democratic transition. 
The rapidly expanding role of these so-called “external” actors such as NGOs 
and aid-relief agencies, and their evolving function, cannot be understood simply as 
external intervention. While certainly pivotal to the process of reforms, neither their 
intervention nor their impact could be understood independently of the other parties 
involved. Thus, it was the KRG’s dire need for help, but also its willingness to 
demonstrate its cooperative nature, which eased the flow of NGOs and aid agencies to 
the region. On the other hand, external actors’ main impact was carried through their 
interaction with local activists and NGOs.  
Even if the KRG was not initially devoted to democratization, its utilitarian 
commitments eventually made it easier for the network to target its decision-makers. 
This became evident especially in the post-2003 era. The seeds of democratization, 
sawn during the early 1990s, grew more during the period between 2003 and 2011. As 
the KRG reunited and further established its sovereignty and strengthened its 
interaction with various members of the international community, so as its need to 
legitimize its existence has intensified.  
 
Transition in the Post-2003 KRG: Renewed Crisis and Further Democratization 
The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Ba’th regime re-
boosted the consolidation of the KRG’s domestic sovereignty. Post-invasion Iraq 
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collapsed into a bloody chaos, in which sectarian violence tore the country apart. 
Increasing insurgency rendered the central government unable to extend even the 
most basic services to most parts of the country. The removal of Saddam Hussein 
meant the (temporary) elimination of the constant threat of a Baghdad-initiated attack 
on the region. The Kurdish parties’ support of the invasion meant closer relations with 
the coalition forces.57 And the Kurdistan Region’s over a decade-long isolation from 
the rest of Iraq helped the KRG in keeping it out of the raging violence in the rest of 
the country. Finally, shortly prior to the invasion the divided administrations began 
negotiation reunification, which was mostly completed in 2005. 
In addition, the Kurds made some important political gains in the negotiations 
over a new order in Iraq. The PUK and KDP, together with smaller Kurdish parties, 
ran in a joint list, the Kurdistani Alliance, in the parliamentary elections in December 
2005, in which it won 53 out of 275 seats. This provided the Kurdish leadership with 
leverage over the winning Da’wa Party, led by Nouri al-Maliki in the negotiations 
over the building of the coalition. Through these negotiations, the KRG secured a 
constitutional recognition as a regional government in federal Iraq; regional control 
over newly discovered oil reserves; a promise to conduct a referendum over disputed 
territories in the Kirkuk governorate; and the appointment of Kurds to key positions in 
the federal government, including the nomination of Talabani as President of the 
Republic. 
In short, then, the KRG came out of the war stronger than ever. Sensing the 
coming protest, the Kurdish leadership once again committed to Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, publicly renouncing any aspiration for independence or desire to establish 
Greater Kurdistan. Yet, this did not pacify Ankara’s fears. The Justice and 
Development Party (known for its Turkish acronym AKP)-led government launched a 
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multifaceted campaign against the idea of Kurdish autonomy. Its actions included 
sending Turkish peacekeeping forces to the contested territories, especially those 
populated by Turkomans (Turkish-speaking minority); constant allegations against the 
KRG for sheltering the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK);58 and even 
assassination attempts against Kurdish officials in the contested territories.59 In 
addition, Ankara began pressuring the allies into limiting Kurdish autonomy. This 
pressure yielded some results. In one instance, L. Paul Bremer, the Administrator of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq (CPA), and Lieutenant General David 
Petraeus, the Commander of the Multi-national Security Transition Command Iraq, 
demanded that the Kurdish parties would remove the KRG flags from buildings in the 
region and wave the Iraqi flag instead.60 
Facing this crisis of legitimacy, the reunified KRG renewed its endeavour to 
legitimize its existence and sovereignty. As in the early 1990s, the KRG resorted to 
portray itself as adherent to global democratic norms. The reunification of the KRG 
was marked with general elections for the presidency of the region and the regional 
parliament. The Kurdistani Alliance ran in the regional elections as well and won 
more than 90 percent of the seats in the parliament, with the KDP’s leader Mas’ud 
Barzani elected as president.61 11 seats were reserved for representatives of the 
Christian minority. The minimum quota for women representatives rose from 25 
percent (as set in 1992) to 30 percent – as part of the KRG’s effort to overshadow the 
decision of the Iraqi Council of Representatives to set a 25 percent quota. 
As in 1992, the Kurdish leadership celebrated the election campaign as a proof 
of Kurdish earned sovereignty. The KRG began issuing pamphlets describing itself as 
‘the other Iraq’ and as an oasis of stability, prosperity and tolerance, or as ‘a 
committed force for freedom and democracy in a part of the world that desperately 
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needs it’.62 And amid the persecution and targeting of Christians in the rest of Iraq, 
official Kurdish media outlets revelled in the KRG’s protection of Christian 
minorities in the region.63 And as in 1992, the 2005 democratization was limited. The 
formation of a coalition with more than 90 percent of the MPs put to question the 
Kurdish leadership’s sincerity with regard to parliamentary democracy. Gender-based 
violence remained endemic in the region and figures of honour-killings soared. 
Prisoners, and particularly suspected Islamists, were maltreated and journalists 
associated with the opposition were persecuted by the local security forces.64 And 
while the KRG took pride in protecting and integrating minorities in the political 
system, non-Kurdish minorities in the contested territories in the Kirkuk and Ninawa 
provinces claimed to be persecuted by the Kurdish authorities.65 Nevertheless, 
democratization remained the main framework within which the KRG manifested its 
right to sovereignty.  
In parallel, the post-2003 Kurdistan Region witnessed a dramatic increase in 
the activities of international NGOs and aid agencies in the region. After the fall of 
the Ba’th regime, and with the CPA’s encouragement, an extraordinary number of 
international NGOs flowed to the country in order to take part in the process of post-
conflict reconstruction. With the deterioration of political instability in Iraq into full 
scale violence, many of these NGOs were forced to limit their operations to the 
relatively peaceful Kurdistan Region.66 They were soon joined by the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which was established in summer 2003, as part 
of international community’s effort to join the allied forces in rebuilding Iraq. 
UNAMI’s mission was not limited to providing material support. Rather, its activities 
now focused also on capacity-building and introduction of standards of good 
governance to the Iraqi and Kurdish authorities.67 The importance of UNAMI’s 
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intervention was that rather soon it began to distinguish between Baghdad and the 
KRG, treating the latter independently. It thus bolstered the KRG’s sense of autonomy 
and sovereignty. 
Members of the Kurdish diaspora, viewing the KRG as the embodiment of 
Kurdish sovereignty, have been highly visible in this transnational activism.68 Inspired 
by their experiences in the West and their exposure to Western norms of governance, 
they became advocates of the same values in the region.69 Gradually, these actors 
joined in creating a transnational network of activists in the Kurdistan Region. In 
contrast to the early 1990s, in 2005 these transnational networks could now hold the 
KRG accountable to its failures to meet the statements and commitments made by its 
leaders. Some of them began documenting the KRG’s violations of democratic 
norms.70 Others began leading local campaigns for reforms. 
Examples for changes driven by transnational activism are numerous. In one 
such example, a Sulaymaniyah-based NGO, the Kurdish Institute for Elections (KIE), 
used financial support provided by American NGOs such as the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute and the National 
Endowment for Democracy to organize pre-elections seminars before the 2009 
elections. In these seminars “The scope of the discussions reached to that range of 
talking about violations of human rights by the political power, lack of social equality 
and equity, lack of services, lack of individual freedom and other public problems in 
the society.”71 In another instance, the KIE joined other local and international NGOs, 
such as the German WADI Foundation and the American Civil Society Initiatives, to 
campaign for the introduction of a draft law for organizing rallies and demonstrations 
in the Kurdistan Region. This inspired a bill, which was submitted by 23 MPs to the 
regional parliament and was passed in October 2010. It was the first instance of legal 
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regulation of public protest in the Kurdistan Region since the formation of the KRG.72 
In another example, a local youth movement named Ayinda (future), funded and 
sponsored by American NGOs such as IRI, successfully advocated the lowering of the 
minimum age of candidacy in the Kurdish elections from 30 to 25 in the 2009 
elections. As reported in the aftermath of the campaign,  
Following that success, Aynda helped train young candidates running for 
parliament in that election, and in large part due to the Center’s efforts, today 
four percent of the Kurdish Region’s parliament is under the age of 30. These 
youth representatives would not hold their seats without the efforts of the Aynda 
Center.73 
The 2009 elections, which followed a long period of popular and transnational 
activism, witnessed a dramatic transition in the Kurdistan Region. For the first time, 
an opposition list managed to cross the threshold. The Gorran (Change) List, which is 
comprised mostly of PUK dissidents, won 23.5% percent of the votes. For the first 
time in the KRG’s history, the government faced a substantial opposition bloc. 
Although initially dismayed by the new development, the Kurdistani Alliance 
embraced the results and used them to highlight the KRG’s democratic nature. Qubad 
Talabani, the KRG’s representative to Washington stated in front of an audience at the 
Washington-based Middle East Institute that “We were challenged by some to 
achieve the ‘gold standard’ in elections. We accepted that challenge – and we 
delivered. We have achieved much in our experiment in democratic self 
governance…”74 Thus, he acknowledged the constant pressure facing the KRG to 
democratize its political system. 
Activism also led to changes in the field of gender equality and the struggle 
against gender-based violence. During the 1990s the Kurdish authorities remained 
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indifferent, at times hostile, to the plight of local activists. Yet, the 2000s marked a 
change. First sign was the step taken by both the divided administrations’ 
criminalization of honour-killings, which up until then had a quasi-legal status in the 
Iraqi family law, which was also used by the KRG(s). Feminist activists in the 
diaspora joined local activists in demand for reforms. They campaigned to the PUK 
and KDP women’s organizations. Those in turn lobbied the politburos of their 
respective parties to amend the law.75 
In the post-2003 period, the capability of women’s rights activists to advocate 
their cause was enhanced. They enjoyed access to new resources, and links between 
local and international activists became denser. Some of these activists used their 
resources to bring the KRG’s incompetence in protecting women from domestic 
violence to international public opinion. This was done, for example, by the German 
WADI foundation and Human Rights Watch, which published reports on the 
prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM) in parts of the Kurdistan Region;76 or 
a project led by diaspora feminist activist, Nazand Begikhani, about the rise in cases 
of honour-killings.77 In other cases, advocates have associated government action 
against gender-based violence with good governance and international legitimacy. In 
one such initiative, UNAMI supported a research conducted by a local NGO, Asuda, 
on the subject of gendered-violence in the Sulaymaniyah governorate.78 The report 
implicitly underlined the KRG’s sovereignty by noting that it should adhere to the UN 
General Assembly Resolution working towards the elimination of crimes committed 
in the name of honour, according to which “states have an obligation to prevent, 
investigate and punish perpetrators.”79 
Though publicly rejecting this criticism,80 the KRG began taking measures 
toward tackling the issue. It formed a special body to monitor the enforcement of the 
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legislation and opened government sponsored-shelters for women at risk for the first 
time in 2009. And in 2011 the regional parliament criminalised FGM and forced 
marriage and set obstacles (without abolishing) polygamy.81 One may argue that 
countering gendered-violence does not fall into the definition of democracy. But 
beyond the cause itself, the ability of local and international activists to advocate their 
cause is a sign of a democratic transition. 
Post-2003 advocacy also facilitated changes in the KRG’s policies toward 
freedom of expression. Whereas new media outlets initially flourished in the region, 
reporters soon began to feel the KRG’s wrath. Immediate victims were those who 
exposed alleged cases of corruption by senior officials and members of the security 
apparatus. Here as well, protest was transnational in nature. In one instance, when the 
regional court sentenced a Vienna-based Kurdish journalist to 30 years in prison for 
defaming the Barzani family in 2005, it was the outcry of Kurdish journalists, as well 
as international organizations such Reporters without Borders (RWB), that drove the 
Austrian government to act for his release.82 Grievances on the KRG’s persecution of 
journalists were also picked by Amnesty International that underlined them in its 2009 
report.83 
Although denying these accusations as well,84 the KRG did embrace the 
criticism and engaged in a dialogue. Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG’s Prime Minister, 
met with the representatives of Amnesty International – the only regional leader to do 
so at the time – and discussed with them about their findings.85 The KRG also 
reformed its own attitude toward journalists. The first step taken by the KRG on the 
issue was the legislation of Law No. 24, Press Law in September 2007. This took 
place after a meeting between President Mas’ud Barzani and head of the regional 
journalists’ syndicate.86 According to a Freedom House report, the new legislation 
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gave “unprecedented freedoms” to journalists by eliminating imprisonment penalties 
for defamation. It was implemented rather successfully, leading to a “numerical 
improvement” in the general statistics.87 And in its 2010 report, RWB reported that 
The status of press freedom [in the Kurdistan Region] is better there than in 
neighbouring countries and provinces, mainly because of Kurdistan’s adoption, 
in 2007, of a protective Law of Journalism. The Kurdish intelligentsia is 
dynamic, and the number of its media outlets has exploded in the last few 
years.88 
Once again, transnational advocacy played an important role in the KRG’s decision to 
reform. Indications for that can be found in the KRG’s deliberation (through its 
official media outlets) with Human Rights Watch over the latter’s report in which it 
condemned the KRG for its treatment of journalists,89 or in discussions with 
representatives of Western international organizations in the region, in which the 
KRG invoked its protection of journalists.90 
One should be careful when assessing democratization in the KRG. The many 
flaws in the process are visible even to sympathetic observers. The democratic 
transition in the KRG has been far from linear. In 2011 the region experienced 
something of a relapse into the Ba’thist days, when three protestors were killed in 
clashes with regional security forces in the city of Sulaymaniyah.91 And as RWB 
noted in its 2012 index of freedom of journalism, “journalists are very often the target 
of violence by the security forces… in Iraqi Kurdistan, a region that had for many 
years offered a refuge for journalists.”92 Nevertheless, even if precarious, the KRG’s 
democratic transition, which encompassed various aspects of democracy, is genuine. 
Transnational networks were involved in many of the campaigns leading to these 
reforms, either by conveying ideas related to the reforms, or by lobbying the 
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government to take action. The KRG’s crisis of legitimacy and its consequential 
pursuit of legitimacy served such advocacy in different ways: it compelled the KRG 
to aspire to understand international expectations and standards of good governance; 
facilitated greater interaction between the KRG and the international community; and 
provided advocates with access to Kurdish policy-makers. Hence, democratic 
transition in the KRG could not have been achieved without the conditions created by 
its crisis of legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion 
The most noticeable characteristics of unrecognized states are the existence of 
domestic sovereignty; and the international community’s refusal to acknowledge this. 
For unrecognized states this is a predicament which they strive to overcome. On the 
other hand, as studies of de facto states have vividly demonstrated, in most de facto 
states this predicament has not hindered the process of state-building, including the 
prospects of democratization. 
The contentious status of unrecognized states has meant that most studies of 
democratic transitions have simply ignored them, or view democratization in such 
cases as implausible. Recent studies have challenged this tendency in the literature. 
They have demonstrated that non-recognition, or the absence of international legal 
sovereignty, does not hinder democratization. Building upon these studies, this paper 
has argued that not only does non-recognition not hinder democratization, but in fact 
it can facilitate democratic transitions in unrecognized states. The explanation for that 
lies in the crisis of legitimacy which is inherent to non-recognition. This crisis drives 
unrecognized to seek to legitimize their existence. This compels them to interact with 
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the international community; and it enables transnational advocacy networks to 
promote their cause and lobby the authorities. 
The KRG sets an excellent example for this process. Since its birth in 1991, its 
leadership engaged in a pursuit of legitimacy. This has relied heavily on the KRG’s 
earned sovereignty, and particularly its budding democratic transition. This has served 
various actors from both within and outside the region to join hands and collaborate 
for lobbying further political reforms and democratic transition. Even if the KRG’s 
initial commitment to democratization was perhaps insincere, it eventually paved the 
way toward further transition.    
The argument advanced here does not apply only to unrecognized states. It 
suggests that crises of international legitimacy, associated with international legal or 
Westphalian sovereignty, can serve as platform for domestic changes. It requires an 
actor subjected to deficiency in legitimacy – but also an international community that 
believes that Westphalian sovereignty can be breached in favour of supporting 
domestic sovereignty. That unrecognized states go through democratic transitions is 
because the international community advances such values. Increasing isolationist or 
relativist inclinations among leading members of the international community may 
strengthen other members’ Westphalian sovereignty. However, it may weaken their 
domestic sovereignty, that is, if we accept the idea that democracy, in its holistic 
definition, can serve as the foundation for a solid domestic sovereignty. 
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